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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY oF CARE-EFFECT OF PUBLIC CAIUUER's FINANCIAL 
CAPACITY ON LlABILITY-Plaintiff sustained injuries when she fell between 
defendant's subway car and a platform directly opposite the car door. The 
cause assigned was the pressure from the closely packed crowd of subway 
passengers during a rush hour which resulted in plaintiff's being "carried by 
the crowd" into a position of danger. Defendant had shifted extra guards 
to the overcrowded area. No evidence of disorderliness or gang action appeared. 
In an action for damages due to defendant's negligence in failing to control 
the crowd, held,. for defendant. Callaghan v. New Yark City Transit System, 
204 Misc. 236, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 796 (1953). 
Though dealing with a fact situation ubiquitous in negligence cases, the 
opinion in the principal case is unique in containing a forthright statement 
that defendant public carrier could not financially afford an imposition of 
liability for crowd action.1 The element of foreseeability so often used to 
determine the presence of a duty and the various well-wom tests of legal 
cause were ingeniously ignored by the court.2 The opinion is somewhat 
reminiscent of the classic Ryan case, where a New York court held a railroad 
not liable for damage due to fire spread from its locomotive-a liability, in 
the words of the court, "against which no prudence could guard, and to meet 
which no private fortune would be adequate."3 It is quite apparent that any 
finding of duty or causation in cases involving public carriers is a product of 
1 The court recognizes a trend toward stiffening the burden of plaintiffs seeking to 
establish negligence on the part of subways, saying: ''Doubtless the courts realize that since 
subways are not operated at a profit but at a heavy loss, the public welfare will not be 
advanced by rules of decision imposing higher and higher standards of care upon the 
Transit System •••• " Principal case at 797. 
2 See the early case of Hoag v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 85 Pa. 293 
(1877), for a typical application of the tests of unforeseeability and intervening force to 
support a holding that there was no legal cause for the spread of fire from a train wreck. 
3 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 at 216 (1866). 
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judicial blending of such rationalizations as foreseeability, intervening cause 
or last clear chance, and of public policy considerations. But realism may be 
stifled by such a blend where the courts' legal rationalizations are stated while 
their policy considerations go unsaid. It may be, as Professor Ehrenzweig 
thinks, that a truer test of public enterprise liability for negligence lies not in 
the foreseeability of a harm but in its "typicality," i.e., whether "the harm 
was typical for its [the carrier's] activities, and thus calculable and reasonably 
insurable."4 However, a public carrier's ability to insure against the results 
of its negligence may turn on such conflicting policy questions as whether the 
carrier operates at a loss and must be protected from bankruptcy or whether 
it should be left to spread the cost of its liability throughout the community 
via increased fares and taxes. Whichever rationalization, foreseeability or 
typicality, is used, it seems clear that filtrations of social policy in a state 
whose prosperity depends upon railroads will color the decisions of its courts.11 
New York cases seem to indicate a trend in the direction of nonliability of a 
subway for crowd injuries beyond the control of the carrier, 6 and also an -
inclination for reduced liability in spread-of-fire cases involving railroads.7 
Kansas, with acres of uninsured farmlands, exhibits an opposite social attitude 
toward railroads.8 Notice of such contrariety in policy, when brought out 
into the light from the penumbra} areas of a court's reasoning, may afford a 
much more realistic basis of explaining results in some public carrier cases than 
do the traditional standards and tests of duty and causation. 
John E. Rieck.er, S.Ed. 
4 EmraNZWEm, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 58 (1951). See also note by same 
author in 8 UNIV. Cm. L. Rllv. 729 (1941). The "typicality" test is criticized in Malone, 
"This Brave New World-A Review of 'Negligence without Fault,'" 25 So. CAL. L. Rllv. 
14 at 19 (1951). 
5 Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 l\hCH. L. REv. 1 at 30 (1953). 
6 See Accetta v. City of New York, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 487 (1944); Vogeley v. City of 
New York, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 487 (1944); McKinney v. New York Consol. R. Co., 230 
N.Y. 194, 129 N.E. 652 (1920); Wittes v. City of New York, 265 App. Div. 810, 37 
N.Y.S. (2d) 655 (1942). Cf. Allessi v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 163 Misc. 815, 
297 N.Y.S. 1011 (1937). 
7 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., note 3 supra; Alper v. Ramsden, 113 N.Y.S. (2d) 
745 (1952). 
s This New York-Kansas variance was the subject of a well-drawn comparison in 
Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 l\hcH. L. REv. l at 30 (1953). See also Atchison, T. & 
S. F. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354 (1874). 
